Conflict Early Warning and Early Response

Entries tagged as ‘terrorism’

Swarming Early Response

February 17, 2009 · 1 Comment

John Arquilla had a very interesting Op-Ed in the New York Times this weekend on “The Coming Swarm.” I’ve been interested in John’s work for years given his application of complexity science to the study of terrorism and would have assigned this Op-Ed as required reading for the graduate course I co-taught on “Complexity Science and International Relations.”

John writes about the recent simultaneous suicide attacks in Kabul last week and argues that a new ‘Mumbai model’ of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging:

The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time.

[...] This pattern suggests that Americans should brace for a coming swarm. Right now, most of our cities would be as hard-pressed as Mumbai was to deal with several simultaneous attacks. Our elite federal and military counterterrorist units would most likely find their responses slowed, to varying degrees, by distance and the need to clarify jurisdiction.

Current strategy for counterterrorism contemplates having to respond using “overwhelming force” to as many as three simultaneous terrorist attacks. This would imply mobilizing as many as 3,000 ground troops to each site.

If that’s an accurate picture, it doesn’t bode well. We would most likely have far too few such elite units for dealing with a large number of small terrorist teams carrying out simultaneous attacks across a region or even a single city.

“So how are swarms to be countered?” John asks. In his opinion,

The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force in favor of small units that are not “elite” but rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with swarms, economizing on force is essential.

For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urban areas instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is consistent with existing notions of community-based policing [...]

At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely.

I think John’s recommendations are very important and directly applicable to the field of operational conflict early warning and early response, particularly on the response side.  This means taking more of a people-centered or community-based approach to early response and shifting away from the top-down mentality of “The Responsibility to Protect” to one of “The Responsibility to Empower” from the bottom-up.

Categories: Lessons
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Conflict Early Warning of Mumbai Attacks (Updated)

December 1, 2008 · 2 Comments

Update: Us Warned India Before Mumbai Attack

I’ve been spending the past few days talking to fellow colleagues in the conflict early warning community about the recent carnage in Mumbai. Were there any credible early warnings of the terrorist attacks? Macro-level conflict early warning models forecast specific “events of interest” but rather assess structural risk over longer time spans. So these models did not forecast the attacks. Any likely warning would have to originate from intelligence sources, just as occurred in Kenya.

News is now just coming in that warnings had been communicated to The Taj Mahal Hotel. The chairman of the company that owns the hotel noted how ironic it was that “we did have such a warning, and we did have some measures” but he did not elaborate on the warnings or what security measures were enacted (1). While I recognize that the warnings may not have been particularly specific, what surprises me is why the residents of Mumbai themselves were not alerted about the increased security risk?

Given that 75% of Mumbai’s residents have mobile phones, it would have been feasible to set up a dedicated phone number for residents to send text messages in case they saw something suspicious. The intelligence community tends to be highly hierarchical and centralized, which limits the number of “sensors” or “feelers” it has access to. We’ve been talking about crowdsourcing conflict information, why not crowdsource intelligence since 96% of all intelligence information is open source to be begin with? Especially since the first news of the attack was disseminated on Twitter?

Categories: Lessons
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