Towards a Human Security Based Early Warning System

My colleague Albrecht Schnabel and his co-author Heinz Krummenacher recently published (June 2009, PDF) an excellent chapter on a human security approach to conflict early warning and response in an edited book entitled “Facing Global Environmental Change.” (Thanks to MP for flagging this chapter so I could blog about it).

Using human security as a conceptual lens for conflict early warning is not new (see this MA thesis from 2003, for example), but it is a logical extension to the discourse given the shifting definition of security.

The authors argue that the “contextualized, sometimes multi-layered nature of human security must [...] be matched with an equally multifaceted monitoring, warning and response system.” This explains the motivation behind my paper on “Networking Disaster and Conflict Early Warning Systems (2007).” Indeed, I was pleasantly surprised to find so many parallels between the authors’ chapter and the approach I have promoted since 2005. It’s great to see the discourse finally changing.

Authors (2009): Contemporary political early warning systems “focus exclusively on trends leading towards or away from violent conflict. Environmental, economic, and other threats do not feature on the radar screen unless they trigger social unrest or political upheaval.”

Me: No surprises there, to be honest. This really ought to be common sense. I published a co-authored paper in the Journal of Political Geography in 2007 that empirically demonstrates the added value of taking a more multi-sectoral approach in conflict early warning and response.

Authors (2009): “[...] ‘Open source intelligence’ provided more or less exclusively for the donor community is not appropriate anymore–indeed has never been. Early warning information needs to be shared with all stakeholders and the response to human security threats has to be found in a participatory process with the response itself mainly being the responsibility of the local/national governments and non-state actors. [...] Moreover, the up to now ‘extractive’ approach to early warning practiced by Western governments has to give way to one that is based on true partnership.”

Me (2005-present): The above comes as quite a surprise (understatement). I honestly never thought that my former boss Heinz Krummenacher would ever question his hierarchical approach to conflict early warning. To be sure, the FAST early warning system he had co-designed was an excellent example of an extractive approach to conflict early warning.

The above also resonates with a chapter I co-authored in 2006 on open source intelligence and local stakeholders. In addition, that last sentence on the extractive approach to early warning is also verbatim what I wrote in a 2005 co-authored paper.

In 2006, at a time when I wasn’t particularly diplomatic, I wrote the following in another conflict early warning paper:

“The ‘Center-Periphery’ model outlines how Colonial powers preyed on the resources of developing countries to fuel the West’s insatiable thirst for progress through technological innovation. First and second-generation early warning systems [like FAST] replicate a similar pattern. While not preoccupied with diamonds or coltan, these organizations hire locals to mine information (a resource no less precious) in conflict zones. This (previously free) merchandise is then shipped to Bern along secure electronic channels.”

“The data and analysis is then sold to the ‘highest bidders’, not the populations at risk from whence the information originated but to the headquarters of organizations located at a comfortable distance from possible mayhem and bloodshed.”

I also included this quote: “Regional and local interactions between early warning personnel and local people [are] largely non-participatory exercises used to elicit and extract information, not to engage.” Finally, I somewhat provocatively likened first/second generation early warning systems to the Emperor’s new clothes. Like I said, not very diplomatic.

In any case, I’m really impressed to see just how much the mainstream discourse on conflict early warning has changed over the past 5 years. The authors even refer to third generation early warning systems in contrast to state-centric approaches. In addition, the authors emphasize the problems with mainstream definitions of conflict early warning, noting that these are “still focusing on one single facet of the threat spectrum, which is violent conflict.”

This explains why I have been using a people-centered definition of conflict early warning since 2004. The purpose of a people-centered conflict early warning system is to empower local communities to get out of harm’s way and safeguard their livelihoods. Clearly, harm has diverse sources but these must be understood through local perceptions, not through a Western mind-set seeking to apply an academic conceptual framework like human security.

I was particularly pleased to read the authors’ following comment: instead of carrying out human security audits and developing a human security index to prevent violent conflict, what is needed is “the presence of domestic opposition groups who are capable of challenging irresponsible governments by nonviolent means.” I’ve been making this link with nonviolent action for years:

Me (2007): “Although the conflict prevention community has yet to embrace a new discourse let alone a people-centered approach, nonviolent social movements may be the closest parallel we have to people-centered early warning systems.”

“Unlike highly technical and hierarchical early warning systems, nonviolent social actions are more effective in responding to conflict since they recognize the inherently political nature of armed conflict.”

I also quoted the following: “Prevent[ing] violent conflict requires not merely identifying causes and testing policy instruments but building a political movement” since “the framework for response is inherently political, and the task of advocacy for such response cannot be separated from the analytical tasks of warning.”

I was further pleased to see the authors emphasize the critical link to response and the recipients of conflict early warning analysis. The authors also note the decline in available funding in the field of conflict early warning. Unfortunately, they don’t relate this to the fact that major donors originally backed first and second generation early warning systems, which were largely ineffective. There’s no reason to blame the donors, but ourselves.

In my opinion, we need to own up to the failures of traditional approaches to conflict early warning and emphasize to donors that third-generation initiatives and crisis mapping are distinctly different approaches that deserve funding.

Another very pleasant surprise about the Schnabel-Krummenacher piece is the authors’ reference to preparedness and mitigation strategies. Again, this is an approach I’ve been lobbying for since 2004. The authors also address the need to measure success, which has been lacking in the field of conflict early warning. I particularly like their approach:

Authors (2009): “Assessment of response measures requires a clear understanding of the targets, goals and indicators for success associated with each of them. We are thus not dealing with counter-factuals: We do not search for what has not happened (i.e. a crisis), but what has happened (i.e. the effect that counter-measures had on specific root causes).”

Me: It is unfortunate that they don’t include the stakeholders themselves in the assessment and evaluation process, particularly since they advocate a third generation (or people-centered) participatory approach.

Authors (2009): “While even functioning early warning systems will not always lead to early and effective responses, there is no alternative to the creation and strengthening of early warning systems. The often-mentioned claim that despite the ample and timely availability of information and warning, response measures fail due to inadequate political will is also an overstated and unhelpful argument.”

Me: I’m always weary and suspicious when I read “there is no alternative.” I tend to object to using this kind of language. Of course there’s an alternative, as the authors themselves noted, we could work to strengthen local political opposition groups so they can engage in nonviolent actions that can place pressure on ruling regimes.

I do however fully agree that referring to the lack of political will is an unhelpful argument. I had this to say in a 2005 co-authored paper:

“Political will is often cited as the main culprit responsible for late (or no) response. This term, however, is often used as catchword—one that is more descriptive than analytical. Some scholars suggest that the “expression be banned from political discourse” unless it is “subjected to analysis, and, for purposes of action, to pressures and mobilization [...] Lack of political will is symptomatic of numerous underlying pressures that are often personal, professional and political.”

The change in discourse reflected in the Schnabel-Krummenacher piece is truly remarkable. They write that the core reason for the existence of conflict early warning systems is to “generate knowledge about effective response options to prevent major disasters from threatening populations’ safety and survival.” I’m honestly stunned. As readers of this blog will know, the focus on response and preparedness is one that I’ve long pushed for but which has largely been ignored by the mainstream literature.

What is largely missing from this chapter, however, is any reference to communication technology and new-media, which is rather surprising given the authors’ reference to open source intelligence and emphasis on participatory approaches. Surely mobile technology has an important role to play in this respect.

In sum, I am glad to note the significant change in discourse. The fact that conflict early warning experts like Krummenacher are (finally) changing their approach to the field is something I admire and highly respect. I have too often seen scholar-practitioners in this field stick to their own convictions and not have the open mind to consider other alternative approaches. The change in discourse if 5 years overdue. But better late than never!

How Ushahidi Can Become a Real Early Response Platform

As is well known in the field of disaster management, preparedness and contingency planning is core to the success of people-centered early warning networks. See my previous post on “Insights from Disaster Early Warning.” While Ushahidi users can now subscribe to alerts by SMS, there are currently no response protocols linked to these individual alerts. The latter is not necessarily Ushahidi’s responsibility, but the team can play an important role by integrating a form for response protocols within the Ushahidi platform.

Ushahidi is closing the feedback loop between crowdsourcing and crowdfeeding by introducing an alert subscription feature. However, the notion of crowdsourcing response requires further develop- ment so that operational protocols can be implemented.

In other words, although users can subscribe to alerts, this does not mean they will be prepared to react or know what the best response is when they receive said alerts.

I witnessed this first-hand when setting up a community-based conflict early warning and response network in Timor-Leste. To be sure, the notion of “preparing for conflict” is not one that always comes naturally.

Imagine if the disaster early warning community only focused on forecasting and payed no attention to preparedness and contingency planning (PCP). Millions more would die every year without training, shelters and regular drills. PCP can also be applied to conflict early warning and rapid response.

An organization implementing Ushahidi would simply need to do the following: for every indicator category the organization identifies, a response protocol for that alert would be added to an Ushahidi “Reponse Protocol Form.”

So for Indicator “A”, a series of response protocols for that indicator would be listed in the Response Form. These protocols could be customized based on where and when the incident took place. The protocols could include information on nearby shelters, hospitals, police stations, food stocks, etc.

This is primarily logistical but PCP can also be applied to identify and formulate tactics for conflict management.

In Timor-Leste, I ran a short and informal PCP excercise by asking members of a local community to think through what they would do if a land dispute occured in their village. For example, who would they call or notify when they hear about the incident. How would they try and intervene to prevent the situation from getting worse? These questions generated a rich set of action-oriented protocols that drew on their own traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

Ushahidi can plan an integral role in encouraging organizations and communities to think preventively by adding a simple technical functionality to the platform. “Response Protocol Forms” could be used to follow up SMS alerts with SMS Response Protocols. Clearly, the organization deploying Ushahidi would be responsible for ensuring the protocols are correct and up-to-date.

Early Warnings of Kenya’s Election Violence

I just returned to Nairobi from the MobileActive conference in Jo’burg to find that the Waki Commission had finally released its in-depth investigation of Kenya’s post-election violence. The Commission’s report reveals that the country’s intelligence service had clearly warned about the possible violence as early as three months prior to the actual elections.

Yet again, specific actionable warnings were communicated and yet again they failed to trigger an operational response, let alone a successful one. Indeed, according to the Commission’s investigation, “the deadliest of the election-related violence could have been avoided had the Government made use of its own intelligence reports.”

The Commission’s findings were just reviewed in Kenya’s newspaper the Daily Nation. Here are some excerpts adapted from the review:

Intelligence reports warned as early as September last year of violence in specified areas. And Kenya’s spy agency even named individuals behind hate campaigns and regions that were affected.

So glaring was evidence of possible violence that the Waki report notes: ‘Given the extensiveness of the intelligence developed and distributed by the service, it was an almost fatalistic realization that no sufficient preventive action would be taken to ameliorate the situation.

One of the security committee meetings noted a worrying security situation in two districts where Kikuyus were being targeted. It observed: “Whichever way the results go, Kalenjins are planning to attack Kikuyus and invade their farms.”

While there is evidence of good information gathering, intelligence preparation and understanding of security issues, there is a weakness in translating this into clear, demonstrable and useful operational intervention.

Kenya’s spy agency went as far as recommending that operational agencies should come up with specific contingency plans, take action against inciters and financiers of criminal gangs and ensure staff refrained from partisan behavior.

The spy agency accurately forecast what was likely to happen should either political party win the presidential elections. A special report entitled “Critical Dates and Events – General Elections 2007” was forwarded to the chairman of the Electoral Commission three weeks prior to the elections.

What are the implications for the field of conflict early warning and response? The Commission’s investigation demonstrates that warning was not the problem, but rather response. The findings show that expensive early warning systems and sophisticated conflict modeling are absolutely unnecessary for accurate early warnings. More importantly, the results of the investigation provide strong grounds for paying more serious attention to conflict preparedness and contingency planning.

Unfortunately, most of the experts in the field of conflict early warning still fail to recognize the importance of integrating preparedness and contingency planning within conflict prevention strategies. As the main argument goes, successful prevention does away with the need for preparedness. Besides we want to prevent conflict, not prepare for conflict. My reaction? Tell that to the 1,333 Kenyans who died as a result of the violence and their loved ones.

We so often fail to respond early and effectively to escalating violence. When are we going to seriously start asking ourselves: what if we fail? What if we fail to prevent armed conflict? Don’t our beneficiaries, local communities at risk, deserve a straight to answer to that question? Are we prepared to tell them that prevention is more important than preparedness when they come face to face with death?